STRATDELA Special #12: Long-range weapons and modern armed conflicts

Some thoughts on Russia-Ukraine stuff and broader implications

As you might have guessed, now I want to say a few words on the consequences of the use of Western-made long-range weapons by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

STRATDELA has hardly touched on stories related to the warfighting in Ukraine, but the current discussions around the prospects of lifting any geographical restrictions on the use of Western weapons make it necessary to say a few words on this issue as well, since the dimensions of these events may be quite strategic.

Let’s reflect on a number of specific points, and these observations are actually fully applicable to any other participant in any other military conflict.

1. There are no magic wands and silver bullets. Individual successes and media-tasty cases certainly do occur, but the Russian armed forces in general and air/missile defence/air systems and units in particular have demonstrated the ability to adapt to new threats and continue successful combat operations. Sensitive strikes do happen and inflict losses, it takes time (sometimes significant) to adapt, so there is some impact on the course of combat operations. However, this influence does not lead to fundamental changes.

2. Taking into account the adaptation mentioned above and the understandable priority in covering key military infrastructure and state administration facilities with air/missile defence umbrellas in the first place, more strikes are switched to civilian and dual-use infrastructure. Given this trend, as well as the combat performance of defence systems (both surface-to-air missile systems and electronic warfare systems), the accuracy of missiles is decreasing and the number of incidents when missiles are hitting purely civilian objects leading to injuries and deaths of non-combatants is increasing.

3. In such an environment, a direct link between the amount of munitions used and civilian casualties is possible, while no such link between these so-so precision weapon strikes and any significant changes on the battlefield can be seen.

4. Accordingly, further deliveries of such weapons (SCALP and Storm Shadow, and possibly JASSM, ATACMS, long-range munitions for MLRS, including but not limited to HIMARS and Vampire) and their possible use against targets deep inside Russia with a high degree of probability can not and will not lead to significant changes in combat operations in general and the situation on the front, but will lead to a further increase in Russian civilian casualties caused specifically by Western weapons.

5. Despite various exotic opinions that supposedly the suffering of the Russian people will somehow undermine the stability of the Russian government, historical practice suggests otherwise: the people usually demand punishment for the direct source of such suffering.

6. Accordingly, there will be an additional incentive to further escalate the conflict and take it beyond Ukraine's 1991 borders, not only in the eastern direction, but in other directions as well.

7. An additional dimension to the threat of geographical escalation is given by the possibility of attacks on the critical infrastructure of nuclear forces and NC3 elements, which could lead to a nuclear escalation.

8. Russia has so far demonstrated a certain degree of restraint, but this is not due to some kind of ‘weakness’ or ‘fear of retaliation’, but to the perceived possibility of ending the conflict on satisfactory terms without a significant increase in the expenditure of resources of all kinds (see point 1). This can change.

In conclusion, despite some possibility of ‘mirroring’ the above arguments towards Russia, the key difference is the fact that, conventionally speaking, Russia is generally fighting on its own and Russia is already under attack.

In case Ukraine uses Western weapons, of course with Western ISR and targeting systems (and, most likely, with the participation of Western advisors at each stage), it is logical to assume that Western countries will get themselves under attack as well.

And the more sensitive consequences of such use will be for Russia (both for the armed forces and especially for the civilian population) the sooner the same (or even more) will happen to the Western countries.

That’s all for today, hope to share something more positive next time.

Stay tuned, stay strategic.