STRATDELA Special #14: Missile Defense for an island far, far away
You can guess the name of the island, right?
Welcome to Guam!
Guam hosts three U.S. bases critical for the power projection in the Western Pacific: Marine Corps base Camp Blaz, Navy submarine base in Arpa-Harbor, Air Force base Andersen. The U.S. administration emphasizes that Guam is the U.S. territory and an attack against it will be an attack against United States. Guam needs to be defended not only against North Korean missile threat but also Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as uncrewed aerial vehicles.
So far, the U.S. military facilities on Guam are covered by only one THAAD battery with AN/TPY-2 radar, Aegis destroyer, and some Patriot systems. U.S. Army leads the construction of the new Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture (Guam Defense System). In 2024, first radars, interceptor launchers, and command and control systems of the Guam Defense System have entered service. It will be augmented with new elements every year.
(The map from Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System on Guam. Environmental Impact Assessment. Project Information. May 2023.)
Radars
New AN/TPY-6 radar is being developed specifically for Guam. Four of those will be deployed in different sites all over the island to provide 360-degree coverage. As a derivative from Long Range Discrimination Radar in Clear, Alaska, AN/TPY-6 is supposed to do discrimination, tracking, and kill assessment of ballistic targets during midcourse phase of their flight. In 2023, it turned out that these radars was going to be relocatable in order to make them more survivable in case of a missile attack. As part of defense against cruise missiles and UAVs, Sentinel A4 radars are planned. New radars for Patriot systems, Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) are supposed to help with defense against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.
(LTAMDS. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-missile-defense/ltamds)
Taking into account the fact of data sharing between the U.S., their allies and partners, Guam sensors are going to be part of a larger radar network in the Western Pacific: four AN/TPY-2 radars (2 in Japan, 1 in South Korea, 1 on Guam), Australian Jindalee over-the-horizon radar, AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS radar on Taiwan, and Palau island is going to host Tactical Mobile Over the Horizon radar (TACMOR).
Interceptors
The main part of the Guam Defense System is the Aegis Ashore (lite?), Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems, and SM-3 interceptors. Initially the plan was to have launchers mobile but then the idea was rejected. SM-3s launchers are going to be stationary (but looks like moveable) and some of those has been deployed to Guam recently.
SM-3 launcher on Guam
So, actual SM-3 launcher and its organic radar look kind of “Aegis Ashore Lite” compared to the sites in Romania and Poland:
THAAD and Aegis Ashore/SM-3 are supposed to intercept ballistic missiles of range up to 5500+ km. Patriot PAC-3 MSE – against ballistic missiles of less than 3000-km range and cruise missiles of various ranges. Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) – against cruise missiles and UAVs. Guam is going to be the test ground for the composite-battalion approach the Army will use to integrate its missile defense capabilities, primarily the THAAD and Patriot systems.
THAAD batteries were relocated from the original position several years ago, and now the layout is as follows:
Actually the search for their new position was rather fun, many thanks to some data on historical and archaeological sites on the island;)
Another fun fact: Guam THAAD still looks more in the direction of DPRK than PRC.
Integration
All of those sensors and shooters are going to be linked via Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), which, in its turn, is going to be linked with Command and Control Battle Management Communication (C2BMC) system of the U.S. layered integrated missile defense. Thus, a single regional battle picture will be available for the U.S., their allies and partners, to reach an ideal integration situation of ‘any sensor – any shooter’.
Not only defense systems are going to be linked through IBCS but also offensive ones. 2022 Missile Defense Review reads, that offensive capabilities are part of the IAMD. Army Typhon Mid-Range Capability, Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System and other offensive capabilities will be able to take place in a left-of-launch and missile defeat. The latter includes the destruction of launchers which have already launched their missiles. IBCS is planned to provide such offense-defense integration.
The significance of Guam Defense System is that its technological solutions for various systems’ integration will impact the U.S. mainland cruise missile defense development and other regional IAMD architectures (more on this later).
Options and Alternatives
Is this Guam Defense System architecture the only possible, fastest, and cost-effective solution? The discussion is still going on in the U.S. The following are only several of other options:
- To put old Ticonderoga-class cruisers with Aegis systems on anchor in Apra Harbor so that they could provide air and missile defense for the whole island before some bigger IAMD architecture is deployed there. But the U.S. Navy decommission those cruisers from service one by one.
- The whole IAMD architecture cannot be on one island. Radars, interceptors, and other elements should be dispersed among all Mariana Islands instead. It would increase survivability and logistics management in case of a conflict. There is a good chance this idea will be implemented.
- The U.S. administration picked the slowest and the most costly option. Aegis Ashore with SM-3s is good but only if it is like those small variants stationed in Romania and Poland and not some proliferated network with mobile launchers, which lead to barracks and elementary schools construction, and a cost overrun of several billion dollars.
- Cruise missile defense is needed but IFPC will not be operational until 2027. Instead there should be several units of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) which is produced by the NATO ally, Norway, uses U.S.-produced AIM-9X or AIM-120 interceptors and is battle proven in Ukraine.
- The U.S. Army supports the return of an elevated sensor project, like Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). Israel has an elevated sensor as part of its cruise missile defense and such sensor should be part of the Guam Defense System.
- All these elements can be integrated via Link16 but the IBCS won’t be operationally ready till 2030s.
So, why the U.S. Army doesn’t want to use NASAMS? Frank Lozano, Army Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, answers:
“NASAMS – foreign system. There comes evils for us buying foreign systems. Usually we have no intellectual property data rights. And I’m tied to OEM for sustainment for eternity or as long as that system is in the inventory. That can become a very expensive proposition. Without IP rights it becomes very hard to integrate. There’s a need for a AIM-120D-like capability in a AIM-9X package because the key is a magazine depth. Having 6 missiles on a launcher and having a 45-minute reload time you’re not going to be survivable in a Guam defensive situation. IFPC with AIM-9X has 18 interceptors.”
Why the U.S. DoD doesn’t have an elevated sensor in Guam Defense System? The 2013 incident when the JLENS blimp broke free from its mooring station doesn’t seem to be a sustainable reason to reject the system. Perhaps, the real reasons were the lack of cruise missile threat for the U.S. mainland and a survivability issues of an elevated sensor in a combat environment. But since 2015 the cruise missile threat has been repeatedly mentioned by the U.S. military. As for combat environment risks, elevated sensors could be deployed to the Second Island Chain (i.e., Guam) which is much safer location than the First Island Chain in case of conflict. So, this idea still can materialize.
To sum it up, the U.S. military perfectly understand that Guam Defense System won’t provide 100-percent protection, but as Brigadier General Frank Costello, the head of the 94th Army and Missile Defense Command said,
“we are trying to defend long enough to enable the joint force commanders to meet their objectives.”
From “Guam Defense System” to “Iron Dome for America”
When this STRATDELA Special was planned and prepared, we did not expect that Trump administration will be THAT AMBITIOUS. It remains to be seen how it will work out for them, but there is a good possibility that at least some capabilities first demonstrated - and integrated - at Guam will be later used for the big thing. Clearly, the strategic U.S. homeland defense at the moment looks more focused on space-based capabilities, but the overall idea of cross-domain (and multi-domain) sensor-shooter integration is the same. The bottom line is that we are on the brink of a major multi-actor arms race (or even slightly beyond it).
PS THIS Reuters coverage of Guam missile defenses by Gerry Doyle et al. was so good, that it took me a while to try to force myself to complete this special issue and still be able to add something:)
Sources:
https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2024/04/01/army-office-in-charge-of-rapid-development-takes-on-guam-air-defense/
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https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2023/08/09/first-flight-test-for-guam-missile-defense-planned-for-end-of-2024/
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/why-guam/
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https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2024/12/10/mda-conducts-first-ever-ballistic-missile-intercept-test-from-guam/
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https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/exclusive-heres-who-hegseth-is-tasking-to-put-together-trumps-iron-dome-plan/