STRATDELA Special #16
Intermediate-range missiles for everyone, and may no one be left behind.
Hi folks, bad news this week: Russian Post-INF Moratorium initiative is formally dead.
As dead as the original INF Treaty.
Sad.
Anyway, some thoughts.
I will not dive deep into the history of the crises that led to the dissolution of the Treaty in the first place (feel free to ping me and I’ll send out a number of older publications by yours truly, mainly from 2018-2020 period), but will try my best to analyze the current situation.
What was it about?
When the US announced withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, a certain restraint was demonstrated on the Russian side.
President Vladimir Putin was very straightforward in announcing the following:
We proceed from the premise that Russia will not deploy intermediate-range or shorter-range weapons, if we develop weapons of this kind – neither in Europe nor anywhere else until US weapons of this kind are deployed to the corresponding regions of the world.
In October 2020, the initiative was clarified and updated, including with the option of verifying the absence of such missile systems in corresponding regions and subregions:
In this context, we reiterate our commitment to the moratorium earlier declared by the Russian Federation on the deployment of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles until US-manufactured missiles of similar classes appear in the respective regions.
We also believe that our call to NATO countries to consider the possibility of declaring a reciprocal moratorium remains relevant.
To facilitate the search for compromise political and diplomatic solutions, we are ready to take further steps based on the principles of equal and indivisible security and balanced consideration of the parties’ interests that are intended to minimize the negative consequences of the collapse of the INF Treaty.
Building up on our earlier proposal to develop verification tools to support Russia’s initiative on mutual moratoria, we invite all parties concerned to consider specific options of reciprocal verification measures to remove existing concerns.
Both the Biden administration, and the new Trump administration had opportunities to show a constructive attitude, but they failed.
Still, the question remains why Russia have not responded symmetrically all this time, at least in terms of the publicized tests of Kalibr-ashore GLCMs and "medium-range ground-based hypersonic missiles" announced back in the very same 2019. The infamous 9M729/SSC-8 GLCM is also nowhere to be seen.
Apparently, the leadership of the Russian Federation still hoped for the possibility of some kind of agreements, if not with Biden, then with Trump in this area, since, in general, the INF Treaty was a useful treaty, and the moratorium could become a brick in the foundation of a new structure of European, Eurasian, and global security. Unfortunately, some hints of a substantive conversation on this topic from the United States appeared only at the beginning of 2022, but it was already too little and too late.
Why now?
I see three groups of factors that influenced the latest decision: the actions of the USs to build up the relevant capabilities and forward deployment, the involvement of new countries in Europe and Asia in this arms race, as well as the state of Russian developments in this area - especially since the leadership of Russia (and Belarus) clearly has special feelings about the IRBM known as "Oreshnik".
Now, the United States continues to build up the relevant potential and develop advanced basing of new "products", and American allies have joined this process with great enthusiasm. For their part, Russia, our Belarusian allies, and our North Korean, Chinese, and Iranian friends have formed their own views on the benefits of such missile systems both in the context of deterrence and for specific scenarios of their combat use, and in some cases based on the experience of such use during current conflicts.
Specific projects are also being implemented by our potential opponents. To the developments and actions of the US listed in the MFA statement (Typhon, Dark Eagle, PrSM), we can add both European initiatives within the framework of the ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach, which, however, is not developing very rapidly), and missiles of such types that have already appeared or will appear in the near future in the arsenals of South Korea and Japan.
German push to purchase American Typhon launchers as an interim solution (until the mentioned ELSA is ready) are unlikely to be a serious factor in the latest Russian actions, although it does demonstrate persistent plans to create an appropriate potential as soon as possible.
What will happen in Russia
By the end of 2025, new missile regiments and/or brigades with appropriate weapons will probably be formed and deployed (possibly in limited numbers) with an eye to containing threats from both the west and the east. In addition to the much—hyped "Oreshnik", such units may also be armed with land-based versions of cruise "Kalibrs" and hypersonic "Tsirkons", as well as other fruits of Russian rocket engineering - since 2019, when the start of such works has been officially announced, a wide variety of products could be ready for mass production.
Gradually new missile units may appear in all Russian military districts, and they will receive ground-launched cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, and new hypersonic weapons. More intensive "tests in combat conditions" of the corresponding missile systems are also possible.
Moreover, it will affect not only the Strategic Rocket Forces, which will field the Oreshnik, as previously announced. The missile brigades of the Ground Forces and the coastal units of the Navy can get some new tools. Perhaps, as part of the reenactment of the previous Cold War practices, land-based systems with long-range cruise missiles might appear in the Aerospace Forces.
Moreover, I can imagine the creation of “MDTF a-la Russe” within the Airborne Forces as part of their further evolution. Such units can be equipped not only with strike systems of various ranges, but also with their own organic means of air defense, electronic warfare, ISR and other useful elements.
The relevant procedures may be accompanied by public events with the maximum involvement of the media, and possibly the corps of military attaches.
We will definitely see a lot of beautiful test launch footage, as well as some videos from exercises and battle patrols involving these new weapons. Probably we might even see some MFA and MoD briefings about those capabilities.
Based on the state of defense industry and organizational challenges, and in the absence of a political and diplomatic settlement for the Ukrainian crisis, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles of various types may well be fully involved in the special military operation. The tasks for them are clear: the continued overloading and destruction of Ukrainian air and missile defenses, the destruction of both infrastructure facilities, as well as, possibly, time-sensitive mobile targets.
There are hardly any doubts remaining about the deployment of Oreshnik IRBM in Belarus by the end of 2025. Apparently, the new missiles will not be there in time for Zapad-2025 strategic exercises, but at least their future presence on the territory of Belarus is probably taken into account in the exercise scenarios.
Is there an alternative?
The current situation cannot be compared with the period of the last cold war for at least two reasons: firstly, the emphasis is now on non-nuclear equipment for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (however, there is no doubt about the "dual" purpose of at least domestic products), and secondly, much more is involved in the process. countries. What we are witnessing has all the hallmarks of an arms race, both defensive and offensive.
A scenario in the spirit of a "double track decision" is not yet visible, everyone is thinking exclusively about the qualitative and quantitative growth of their own military capabilities. However, in the future, as the obstacles to such rearmament and the escalation risks become clear, it is possible that the process of arms reduction, or at least limitation is mutually beneficial.
Moreover, in the future we may expect a more comprehensive INF Treaty 2.0 with a larger number of participants and a more nuanced coverage. But today we are witnessing a kind of missile renaissance, and it concerns a wide range of missile and "missile-related" technologies and is accompanied by active proliferation of emerging and disruptive technologies. By the way, the "drone revolution" brings to mind the classic Soviet term "samolyot-snaryad" (“airplane-munition”), which previously referred to cruise missiles.
To summarize, nothing particularly good can be expected from such a development. We are at the initial stage of a multilateral missile and missile defense arms race. International military-political relations are in deep crisis, and at this stage, for the vast majority of countries in the world, strengthening their own military potential is a major (or only) priority.
